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ABSTRACT 
We estimate a household consumption function using two rounds of the nationally representative panel of 
living standard measurement survey (LSMS) of Nepal and simulate the impacts of remittance on poverty 
and inequality. We study how these impacts vary with the regional ‘incidence’ and maturity of the 
migration process and with the country-source of remittance. We find that remittance has conditional 
impacts on both poverty and inequality, which largely depends on the ‘incidence’ and maturity of the 
migration process and, more importantly, on how lower quintiles of the society participate in this process. 
The national-level simulations indicate that remittance decreases the head count poverty by 2.3% and 
3.3% in the first round of the survey, and between 4.6% and 7.6% in the second round. It reduces even 
further the depth (at least 3.4% and at most 10.5%) and severity (at least 4.3% and at most 12.5%) of 
poverty. Although overall remittance increases inequality, this is less so in the second round of the survey. 
Furthermore, remittance payment from India, which is on average much lower than from other countries, 
decreases inequality and has the largest impact on poverty reduction. This is due to the larger 
participation of the poor in the Nepal-India migration process. The region-wise simulations show that 
remittance has larger impacts on poverty reduction in the regions that have higher levels of migration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The inflow of international remittance in developing countries (DCs) has increased 
dramatically since 1990s, increasing from US$30 billion in 1990 to US$325 billion in 2010, and 
has emerged as a most important source of private capital flows for dozens of these countries 
(World Bank, 2011). Nepal has also experienced a similar trend, which is far larger in magnitude 
and growth than in other DCs. For instance, the annual work-related emigration to countries 
other than India has increased by 30 times from about 10 thousand in early 1990s to about 300 
thousand in 2010 (Department of Foreign Employment, [DOFE], 2011). The number would be 
much larger if we include migrants who are working in India, with whom there is a reciprocal 
agreement to enter without visa.  As a result, the contribution of remittance relative to GDP 
increased sharply from 2% in early 1990s to 23% in 2009. Currently, as a share of GDP, Nepal is 
among the top five largest remittance recipient countries in the world (World Bank, 2011). 
Remittance is the largest foreign exchange earner and it exceeds the sum of tourism, foreign aid 
and exports earnings in recent years (Shrestha, 2008). Furthermore, due to shortages in the 
domestic labor market (with at least 30% of the workforce being ‘under-utilized’) 1, foreign 
migration is one of the main employment opportunities for Nepalese people.  
On the one hand, the poverty declined remarkably from 42% to 31% during late 1990s 
and early 2000s, despite the modest economic growth and political turbulence (CBS, 2006, p. i-
iii). On the other hand, the inequality (measured by Gini coefficient) also increased sharply (from 
0.34 to 0.41) during this period (CBS, 2006, p. iii). The Asian Development Bank (2007) reports 
an even higher level of inequality (Gini coefficient equal to 0.47) and it concludes that Nepal is 
the most unequal country in Asia among the 22 member countries it studied. Given these 
developments, this research addresses the question: Is the increase in migration and remittance 
the main driving force behind the reduction in poverty and the increase in inequality in Nepal?  
The previous studies have used two general approaches: (i) remittance as ‘exogenous 
transfer’ (see Stark, 1991; Stark, Taylor & Yitzhaki, 1986, 1988) and (ii) remittance as ‘potential 
substitute’ for other household earnings (see Barham & Boucher, 1998; Zhu & Luo, 2010 among 
others), to assess the impact of remittance on poverty and income distribution. The advantage of 
the latter approach is that it allows correlation between remittance income and household 
activities. Furthermore, the statistical techniques used to generate counterfactual consumption 
                                                              
1 Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS], (2009). 
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(income) also affect the results, leading to mixed findings on the magnitude of poverty reduction 
and whether remittance would be income equalizer or un-equalizer (Brown & Jimenez, 2008). In 
addition, heterogeneity in the maturity of the migration-remittance process across countries and 
regions and in the sources of remittances (e.g. domestic versus foreign, or intra- versus inter-
continental), might further widen the variation in results (Taylor, Mora, Adams & Lopez-
Feldman, 2005). To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that disaggregate the impacts 
over time according to prevalence of migration among regions and source of remittances 
applying the approach (ii) mentioned above. 
As for the econometric method, previous literature has used instrumental variables (IV) 
and Heckman Selection methods to control for the endogeneity of remittance income. In contrast, 
we use a fixed effect model that allows for correlation between remittance and unobserved time-
invariant factors (e.g. ability), and did not find further evidence of endogeneity after controlling 
for fixed effects and a large number of control variables. We then carried out simulations at 
national and regional levels to examine the impact of remittance income on poverty and 
inequality. We find that all aspects of poverty (i.e. incidence, depth and severity) would worsen 
in the absence of remittance income, the largest impact being on the severity of poverty. There is 
regional variation in the impact of remittance on poverty: the regions that have higher prevalence 
of migration/remittance experience larger poverty reduction. Among the remittance sources, the 
Indian remittance has the largest impact when compared to domestic and other country 
remittance sources. The overall impact on equality is negative but the negative effect decreases 
over time. In contrast with remittance from other parts of Nepal and third countries, Indian 
remittance works as an income equalizer. These results are consistent with the findings of Stark, 
et al. (1986), Taylor et al. (2005) and the cumulative theory of migration (for detail, see Massey, 
Goldring and Durand, 1994). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the literature 
related to migration, remittance and income distribution in developing countries. The description 
of data and variables is presented in Section III. Section IV discusses the empirical methodology 
on model estimation and simulation. Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes 
with some policy implications. 
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II. MIGRATION, REMITTANCE, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
The impact of remittance on poverty and income distribution in developing countries has 
been extensively investigated since 1980s (see Adams, 1991; Stark, et al. 1986, 1988) with 
mixed findings. In general, it is agreed that migration and remittance reduce poverty. However, 
the magnitude of poverty reduction varies among origin communities, remittance sources, and 
whether remittance is treated as ‘potential substitute’ or ‘exogenous transfer’. Using household 
data from 11 Latin American countries, Acosta, Fajnzylber, and Lopez (2007) found that the 
impact was modest and varied across countries. Considering remittance as ‘potential substitute’, 
Brown and Jimenez (2008) exemplified that Tonga, having longer migration history and higher 
incidence of remittance than Fiji, experienced larger impact on poverty. However, the impact 
was smaller when they considered remittance as an ‘exogenous transfer.’ Considering remittance 
as an ‘exogenous transfer’, Wouterse (2010) found that remittance from African countries had 
larger impacts on poverty reduction than that from other continents in the case of Burkina Faso. 
The impact on income inequality varies among studies, depending on the migration 
history, setting of migration, and endowment of human capital (Stark, et al. 1986). Some studies 
find that migration and remittance do reduce income disparities (e.g. Zhu & Luo (2010) for 
Hubei province of China and Pfau & Long (2011) for Vietnam). However, some other studies 
show that migration and remittance increase inequality (e.g. Adams, Cuecuecha & Page (2008) 
for Ghana and Adams (1991) for rural Egypt). Meanwhile, a few other studies show that the 
direction of impacts depends on the methodology used (Barham & Boucher, 1998), choice of 
destinations (Wouterse, 2010), setting of migrant communities (Taylor et al., 2005), and maturity 
of migration process (Brown & Jimenez, 2008).  
In the study of Nicaragua, Barham and Boucher (1998) found that remittance would work 
as an income equalizer when they treated it as an ‘exogenous transfer’ but it would work as a un-
equalizer when they treated it as a ‘potential substitute’ of household earnings. Taylor et al. 
(2005), considering remittance as an ‘exogenous transfer’ in the study of rural Mexico, found 
that the impact depends on the incidence of migration in each region; the regions having higher 
level of foreign migration have lower inequality and poverty. 
There are few studies on migration and remittance for Nepal. Existing studies have 
generally focused on the evolution process of migration (for example, Thieme & Wyss, 2005; 
Yamanaka, 2000) or determinants of migration (see Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008; WFP, 2008). 
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Although these studies have discussed the increased importance of migration and remittance, 
there are limited studies that relate the migration-remittance process to welfare. Milligan (2009) 
investigated the impacts on child welfare and household consumption and found that the 
elasticity of consumption from remittance income is far lower than that of non-remittance 
income for all consumption categories considered. 
In addition, Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovskim, and Glinskaya (2007, 2010) used cross-
section data and a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method with instrumental 
variables (i.e. proportion of migrants at ward/district level). They found that increased migration 
for work contributed about one-fifth of poverty reduction in Nepal during 1995-2004 but it had 
positive and insignificant impacts on inequality. 
We relax the assumptions in previous studies by controlling for household fixed effects 
while at the same time study the regional variation of the impact of remittances and the 
importance of the remittance source.  
III. DATA 
We use two rounds of the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) conducted by Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of Nepal. The first round (NLSS I) was conducted in 1995/96 
(hereafter 1996) while the second round (NLSS II) was carried out in 2003/04 (hereafter 2004). 
The survey had followed the Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) methodology 
developed by the World Bank for both rounds. It adopted a two-stage stratified sampling 
method2. In this study we use a balanced panel of 962 households, out of the 1,232 households 
that were enumerated in 2004 (CBS, 1996, 2004).  
The survey used similar household and community questionnaires in both rounds. The 
household questionnaire collects information on household demographic composition, housing, 
access to facilities, expenditure, land, asset holdings, education, health, employment, farming 
and livestock, credit and savings, remittance, transfers, etc. The community questionnaire 
collected information on community, infrastructure, facilities, market and prices both for rural 
and urban wards. It also collected data on agriculture, migration, school, health facility, etc. for 
rural wards (CBS, 1996, 2004). 
                                                              
2 For further details on the sampling procedure see CBS (2004).  
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We constructed the consumption aggregate following Deaton and Zaidi (2002), with the 
exception that we included health expenditure as consumption expenditure3. Household per 
capita consumption or per capita expenditure equivalence (PCE), the dependent variable, is 
calculated by dividing household consumption by household size where the household size 
includes all the members who were either at home for at least 6 months or were born during the 
survey year. 
Due to data limitations, we cannot separate the effect of migration (through having an 
absent member) from that of received remittance. From the data we cannot know whether the 
remittance sender is an absent member of the household, a relative from another household or 
just a friend. So, we cannot disentangle the effect of having an absent member from the effect of 
receiving remittance income. Instead, we are merely focusing on the combined effect of 
migration and remittance.  
The pre-migration household size and its composition exclude the absent members of the 
household who were out of home for more than 6 months at the time of the survey. The 
household head is considered as having a migration history if he or she had come from another 
village, municipality or foreign country except for seasonal migration. A person is ‘employed’ if 
he or she worked at least an hour during the last seven days or was on temporary leave; and 
‘unemployed’ if he or she did not work during that period but was looking for work, was waiting 
to hear from a perspective employer to start a new job, could not find work or did not know how 
to look for work. The major occupation of the household head is the first occupation reported in 
the questionnaire (CBS, 2004). The remaining explanatory variables are explained in the next 
section IV.A. 
IV. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
A. Econometric Approach 
As migration involves risks and uncertainties that are difficult to evaluate (Williams & 
Balaž, 2011), the credit and insurance market rarely finances for it. Instead, the migration-
remittance process becomes a self-enforcing and cooperative contract between migrants and their 
families that provides coinsurance against risks and uncertainty (Stark, 1985, 1991). The 
                                                              
3 Other components of the consumption aggregate are expenditure on food, non-food items, housing and flow of services from durables. 
Weighted food price indices are computed as the proxy for all prices, except rent prices, for six statistical regions based on the ‘share of 
food’ and other components available in the survey. These price indices are used to compute regional Laspeyres price indices and 
household aggregate consumption is deflated using these price indices to adjust for the differences in cost of living across regions. 
Finally, consumption for NLSS II (2004) is deflated at the constant price of 1996 using the national consumer price index. 
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household plays the role of both investor and insurer during migration while the migrant 
altruistically sends remittance which in turn provides insurance for household production, 
consumption and inheritance (Stark, 1985, 1991; Stark & Lucas, 1988). Therefore, migration is a 
household level decision that maximizes welfare (for a theoretical review, see Bhattacharya 1985 
and Stark, 1991), and hence it is important to allow for correlation between remittance/migration 
decisions and household activities. Indeed, the literature on migration and remittance argues that 
the characteristics of migrant households and non-migrant households might be different and 
thus unobserved factors might determine both migration\remittance decisions and consumption 
patterns (Barham & Boucher, 1998; Borjas, 1987). Since the pooled OLS estimates might be 
inconsistent, we use the following unobserved effect model (Wooldridge, 2002, Section 10.2): 
ln(PCEit) =  α + βRit +γXit +δGi + ηEi + dt + fi + εit    (1)  
where, ln(PCE) is the natural logarithm of per capita consumption (PCE) 4 of a household 
i, dt is a time dummy, fi captures time invariant factors for each household and εit are 
idiosyncratic errors that change across t as well as i. (Xit, Gi, Ei, Rit) are observed regressors. Rit 
is a remittance related regressor that represents either a dummy for whether a household received 
remittance or the actual log remittance income received (log of 1 plus remittance income, so as 
to include the households who do not receive remittance). The parameter of our interest, β, 
captures the gain in household welfare, measured by log of per capita consumption, due to the 
migration-remittance decision. Xit is a set of household and community characteristics. The 
household characteristics include household size and its composition, characteristics of 
household head, per capita pension income, dummies for the service flow of durables purchased 
at least one year prior to the survey and dummies for agricultural land holding. We also use 
binary indicators (‘Upper caste’ (Brahmin/Chhetri), ‘Lower Caste’ (Dalit), ‘Newar’, ‘Migrating 
Janajati’, and ‘Other caste/ethnic group’)5 to control for caste and ethnicity characteristics. We 
use six regional dummies (Gi) to control for spatial premiums on consumption, and migration 
costs associated with socio-physical proximities (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008). To capture 
community level externalities on welfare, we use several ward level characteristics such as mean 
household consumption, and proportions of population above 15 years who were illiterate or 
                                                              
4 Alternatively, one could implicitly estimate the adult equivalence per capita consumption by estimating the model with total household 
consumption as the dependent variable while including natural logarithm of household size and dependency ratio as explanatory 
variables. 
5 ‘Migrating Janajati’ includes ‘Gurung’, ‘Magar’, ‘Rai’, ‘Limbu’ and ‘Thakali’, which are ethnic groups with a long and remarkable 
practice of work/business related migration. 
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passed the high school level national exam (SLC), employed or self employed, and in agriculture 
or non-agriculture occupation6. 
In model (1), if the unobserved effect (fi) is uncorrelated with all of the explanatory 
variables, then one could consistently estimate the parameters using a random effect model 
(Wooldridge, 2002, Section 10.5.4). However, there could be an arbitrary correlation between fi 
and observed explanatory variables.  For example, unobserved household characteristics might 
systematically affect migration and remittance (Barham & Boucher, 1998). So, by allowing 
arbitrary correlation between the time-invariant fi and remittance (Rit) in a fixed-effect model 
(Wooldridge, 2002, Section 10.5.5), we can consistently estimate β. However, the endogeneity 
problem might still remain if time variant unobserved factors affect both remittance and 
consumption. For example, when a government systematically implements welfare improvement 
policies targeted to the poor in a particular year, the public transfers might have a negative effect 
on remittance but a positive one on consumption7. We cannot control for systematic time variant 
shocks for a particular household unless we use instrumental variables. To test for this possibility, 
we will rely on migration network instruments8. According to the cumulative theory of migration 
(Massey et al. 1994), the social networks of migrant friends or relatives play an important role on 
migration decisions by reducing migration costs and risks, creating path dependence, and 
facilitating the process of sending remittance safely. We believe that these migration networks do 
not influence consumption directly but only through the effect of remittance income. Following 
de Braw (2010) and Lokshin et al. (2007, 2010), we use the proportion of adults that were at 
least 15 years old and living outside their home town for more than six months during the survey 
year in the community (ward) as one of the instruments. We also use the proportion of 
remittance receiving households as another instrument to make the model over identified (e.g. 
Taylor, et al., 2005; Brown & Jimenez, 2008). We test the validity of the instruments (Anderson-
Canon test and Hansen test9) and then estimate equation (1) using the fixed-effect instrumental 
variable generalized methods of moment (FE-IV-GMM) estimator (Schaffer, 2010).10 However, 
if after controlling for fixed effects remittance was actually exogenous, we would obtain more 
                                                              
6 For the complete list of controls please see Table 4. 
7 For example, when a household realizes a consumption shock in a particular year, migrant members can make instantaneous decisions 
on whether to send remittances and how much to send to their relatives and friends. 
8 For excellent reviews of studies on the role of social network in migration and remittance see Massey et al. 1994 and Munshi, 2003; for 
studies using migration network variables as instruments see McKenzie & Rapport, 2007. 
9 See for example Baum et al, 2003, 2007 for descriptions of these tests.  
10 We use stata routine xtivreg2 written by Schaffer (2010) to estimate FE-IV-GMM model.  
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efficient estimates using the fixed effect estimator. Thus, we conduct a Sargan test (Baum, et al., 
2007) for whether remittance was endogenous. 
B. Construction of Counterfactual Consumption 
Based on the above models of log consumption, we use our estimates to construct 
counterfactual consumption patterns under several scenarios for remittance income. At the time 
of estimating the parameters of equation (1) we did not assume any parametric distribution for εit. 
However, for the purpose of simulating mean consumption and poverty/inequality measures, this 
assumption becomes necessary. We first consider several parametric distributions, in particular 
normal as well as student t-distribution (with 2 up to 30 degrees of freedom) with zero mean and 
constant variance (homoskedasticity) or varying variance (heteroskedasticity)11 for the error term 
(εit). We chose a student t-distribution with 30 degrees of freedom and heteroskedasticity because 
it produced predicted values for consumption, poverty and inequality that are closest to the actual 
values. Thus, for each household we generate 10,000 values of ln(PCE) using the following 
equation:  
)2(ˆˆˆˆˆˆ)ln( itiitititit fGXRPCE     
where itˆ  are random draws from the selected distribution and ( ifˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  ) are given by the 
fixed effects estimator. The predicted values of ln(PCE) for these households are used to 
compute mean per capita household consumption under different scenarios as well as indices of 
poverty and inequality. By fixing alternative values for Rit we can simulate the impact of 
remittances on the quantities of interest.  
C. Simulation 
We do simulations at the national and regional levels12 (see Tables 5, 6 and Figure 1). We 
also analyze the impact of the source of remittance (i.e. domestic, foreign, Indian and other 
countries) in Table 7. We report simulation results for two counterfactual scenarios: (a) no 
household receives any remittance and (b) 1% increase in the proportion of remittance receiving 
households separately using the estimates from both the remittance-dummy model and the 
                                                              
11 In the homoskedastic case, the variance of it is estimated as explained in Wooldridge (2002, p. 271, expression 10.56). In the 
heteroskedastic case, we first regress the squared value of the fixed effect residuals on all explanatory variables. The predicted values of 
this regression yield an estimate of ),,,|var(),,,|( 2 itititititititititit EGXREGXRE   .  
12 The six statistical regions are Kathmandu valley (KTM), other urban areas (OTHUR), Rural Western Hills/Mountains (RWH), Rural 
Eastern Hills/Mountains (REH), Rural Western Terai (RWT) and Rural Eastern Terai (RET). 
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remittance-amount model. In the remittance-dummy model, when we increase the proportion of 
remittance receiving households by 1%, these households start to receive remittance equal to the 
average baseline per capita remittance income among remittance receiving households. 
Following Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT, 1984), we use three main measures of poverty 
– head count poverty (P0), poverty gap (P1) and poverty gap squared (P2) – to analyze the 
implications of remittance on incidence, depth and severity of poverty, respectively. P0 is the 
number of people below the poverty line while P1 is the aggregate poverty deficit of the poor 
relative to the poverty line. P2 is sensitive to changes in the income distribution among the poor 
and gives higher weight for poor households who experience extreme poverty13. In our analysis, 
we use two types of poverty lines – the national poverty line that is based on the cost of the basic 
need (CBN), and is equivalent to 2,114 Kcal per day for 1996 (NPR 5,089 per year) and 2,144 
Kcal per day for 2004 (NPR 5,216 per year at constant price of 1996),14 and international poverty 
lines - PPP US$1/day and its double15. 
We use the Gini index, a widely used measure, to explore the impacts of remittance on 
consumption inequality16.  
D. Limitations 
Firstly, it is possible that the effect of remittance on consumption for a particular year 
does not capture the full impact on household welfare. Remittance income could be invested or 
saved for future consumption and/or children’s education. However, we tested this hypothesis by 
including interactions of remittance and dummies for the number of children in the household. 
All these interactions turned out to be insignificant, with negative sign for households with one, 
two or three children and positive sign for households with four or more children, implying that 
there is no strong evidence to suggest that remittance is being saved for children’s education. 
Secondly, as mentioned in Section III, it is difficult to separate the impact of migration (through 
absent members) from that of remittance. Finally, this study captures the direct impacts of 
                                                              
13 The FGT index satisfies the property of monotonicity and other transfer axioms for poverty measures (Ravallion, 1992). 
14 The difference in the calorie intake between two rounds of survey was due to change in the household composition during 1995-2004 
(for detail, see CBS, 2004). 
15 PPP US$1/day at constant price of 1993 is equal to NPR 4,508/year at constant price of 1996. 
16 The Gini coefficient satisfies the desirable properties for an inequality index such as adherence to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, 
symmetry, independence of scale, homogeneity with respect to population, and decomposability (Taylor, et al. 2005). 
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remittance on consumption of recipient households, but it cannot measure the externalities of 
massive inflow of remittances or massive emigration on the economy.17 
V. RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Results 
Table 1 shows descriptive measures on poverty and consumption in Nepal for each of the 
two rounds of NLSS. For the sake of comparison, they are calculated using both our panel of 962 
households and the full NLSS sample (as reported by CBS, 2006, p. 7-9). Results are similar for 
National level and rural areas, but vastly different for urban areas. It implies that some top 
quintile households in urban areas could not be tracked in both rounds. Panel C in Table 1 shows 
how poverty, consumption and household assets holdings vary across regions. For instance, 
Kathmandu valley has the lowest incidence of poverty (12% and 3% for 1996 and 2004 
respectively) and the highest per capita consumption and durables holding. In contrast, Rural 
Western Terai has the highest incidence of poverty (58%) in 1996 whereas in 2004 the highest 
incidence of poverty is found in the group of urban areas that excludes Kathmandu (41%). 
[Table 1 about here] 
The incidence of poverty among remittance receiving households is lower (37% in 1996 
and 28% in 2004, Table 1, Panel D) than the national average (41% and 32%, respectively, Table 
1, Panel A). However, there is substantial variability among remittance-receiving households. 
For example, the poverty is highest (43% and 36% in 1996 and 2004 respectively), even larger 
than the national average, among the households that receive remittance from India. It is lower 
for domestic (i.e. within Nepal) migrant households (35% and 27% in 1996 and 2004 
respectively) and lowest for other countries migrant households. On the one hand, the lowest 
poverty level among third country migrant households is not only related to the higher return 
from migration but also to the higher participation from upper quintiles (Table 2, Panel D). On 
the other hand, the higher level of poverty among Indian migrant households could be related to 
the relatively larger participation of lower quintile households in the Nepal-India migration 
(Table 2, Panel D). The lower levels of durables and land holdings among Indian migrant 
households (Table 1, Panel D) partially explain that poor households generally send their 
                                                              
17 For example, reduced unemployment, shortage in labor force supply in a particular village exacerbated by the geographical complexity 
of the country and most importantly, increased demand/price of goods, and farm and non-farm labors. 
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members to India due to lack of sufficient collateral for loans required for costly migration to 
Gulf and East Asian countries (WFP, 2008, p. 47).  
[Table 2 about here] 
The prevalence of migration (remittance) by destination (sources) varies across rural-
urban residency and regions (Table 2, Panel B-C). The level of domestic and Indian migration 
(remittance) is higher among rural households while the migration to third countries is high 
among urban residents (Panel B). Among regions, the Rural Western Mountains/Hills region has 
the highest propensity to receive remittance (34% in 1996 and 47% in 2004) from any country 
source. This is reinforced by the relatively longer and well developed foreign migration practice 
in this region. Households of ‘Other urban areas’ have experienced a sharp increase in third 
country migration possibly due to sufficient collateral holding for costly migration, and the 
development of better communications and transportation infrastructure.  
B. Econometric Results 
This sub-section presents the estimation results for natural logarithm of per capita 
consumption (PCE) based on the specifications discussed in Section IV.A. First, we report the 
summary results (Table 3) of the regressions using several econometric methods - pooled 
ordinary least square (POLS), random effect (RE), fixed effect (FE) and fixed effect instrumental 
variable GMM (FE-IV-GMM) models. The specifications (E1) through (E4) in Table 3 are for 
the remittance-dummy model whereas specifications (E5) through (E8) are for the remittance-
income model. All estimation methods use standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and intra-individual autocorrelation.  
[Table 3 about here] 
As discussed above, the pooled regression (specification (E1) and (E5)) estimates are 
unlikely to be consistent. If we abandon the pooled regression, we have a choice of either fixed 
or random effects model. The Hausman test suggests that the fixed effect model (specifications 
(E3) and (E7)) estimates are to be preferred over those of the random effect model 
(specifications (E2) and (E6)). As we argued in the methodology section, the fixed effects model 
allows correlation between remittance and the fixed effect (fi), and thus solves the issues of 
endogeneity caused by time invariant factors. To investigate whether there is any endogeneity 
left caused by time variant factors, we estimate the equation using the FE-IV-GMM estimator 
(specification (E4) and (E8)) using the proportion of adult population that is absent for more than 
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6 months during survey year and the proportion of remittance receiving households as 
instruments. Both the Hansen J statistic and the KPLM statistics indicate that the instruments are 
valid and relevant. Moreover, the Sargan test indicates that remittance is exogenous. 
Alternatively, we have to note that the confidence intervals of FE and FE-IV-GMM 
specifications substantially overlap and that the coefficient of the remittance dummy or 
remittance-income for the FE specification falls within the confidence interval for the FE-IV-
GMM specification. The larger robust standard errors and wider confidence intervals for the FE-
IV-GMM estimation reveal that FE-IV-GMM estimates are obviously less efficient than the FE 
counterparts, in line with standard econometric results (e.g., see Wooldridge, 2002). In contrast, 
if we reduced the set of controls to just household size and time dummy, the tests (not shown in 
tables) suggest that the instruments are relevant, but the exclusion restrictions are not valid. So, 
with a reduced set of controls the estimates would be inconsistent in both the FE model and the 
FE-IV-GMM.  
Table 4 presents the fixed effect estimates for all included regressors for both the 
remittance-dummy and the remittance-income models. Most of the regressors have the expected 
sign although many are insignificant. The coefficient of remittance dummy is significantly 
positive (at 10% significance level): the per capita consumption of remittance receiving 
households is 6.54% (100(exp ( ˆ )–V ( ˆ )/2) - 1), Kennedy 1981) higher than that of non-
recipient households, other things being constant. The remittance elasticity of consumption is 
0.015 and it is significant at 1% level. The small elasticity value (similar to that of Milligan, 
2009) suggests that our estimation might not capture the full welfare effect of remittance. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Both the household size and its composition have significant impact on consumption. The 
PCE decreases with household size, a result that agrees with literature at the theoretical (Deaton 
& Paxson, 1998) and empirical (Lokshin, et al. 2010) level. Similar to previous studies, the 
shares of children (8-15 years old), elderly (more than 64) and most importantly the working age 
men and women (16-64) have positive and significant impacts on consumption. Importantly, the 
impact of working age members is much higher than that of dependents. This shows that if a 
family has a lower dependency ratio, then it experiences higher earnings and higher consumption 
per capita. 
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In contrast with some previous cross-section studies in Nepal (e.g. CBS, 2004; Lokshin, 
et al. 2007), none of the characteristics of the household head (i.e. age and its square, and 
dummies for education, sex, migration history, employment status and occupation) turned out to 
have a significant effect on consumption. However, these characteristics turned out to be 
significant in the pooled OLS and random effects estimations. The households with higher level 
of assets have significantly higher level of consumption. The agriculture land holding has 
positive but insignificant effects. Similarly, ward level characteristics such as employment, 
education and occupation have insignificant effects. Only the ward level average household 
consumption has a significant and large effect on consumption, implying that in communities 
with higher level of development and living standards, households also experience higher 
consumption (Table 4).  
C. Simulation Results 
Table 5 and 6 present the simulation results for the remittance-dummy and the 
remittance-income models, respectively. The baseline simulation uses the actual value of all 
regressors to predict consumption and thereby poverty and inequality measures. We can see that 
the baseline simulation produces values that are close to the actual ones.  
[Table 5 and 6 about here] 
Using the remittance-dummy model, scenario (a) (i.e. no household receives any 
remittance) would make mean consumption decrease by 1.4% in 1996 and 2.1% in 2004 with 
respect to baseline simulation values (Table 5, Panel A). On the other hand, scenario (b), 1% 
increase in proportion of remittance receiving households, makes average consumption increase 
by 0.06% in both years (with respect to baseline simulation). The reason for the larger effect in 
2004 under scenario (a) is that there is a larger proportion of remittance receiving households in 
that year. The simulation results for the remittance-income model are similar, but the magnitudes 
are about 50% larger in both scenarios (Table 6, Panel A). 
C.1. Impacts of Migration and Remittance on Poverty 
First, we simulate the impacts on poverty in two counterfactual scenarios at national level 
(Table 5 and 6, Panel B). Based on the national level poverty line and the remittance-dummy 
model, scenario (a) implies that in 1996 and 2004 the incidence of poverty (P0) would increase 
by 2.3% and 4.6% (respectively), the depth of poverty (P1) would increase by 3.4% and 6.4% 
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(respectively), and the severity of poverty (P2) by 4.3% and 7.5% (Table 5, Panel B). If we used 
the remittance-income model instead, the figures would be larger: 3.3% and 7.6% increase for P0, 
5% and 10.5% increase for P1, and 6.4% and 12.5% increase for P2 in 1996 and 2004, 
respectively (Table 6, Panel B). The effects on all three FGT measures are about two-third larger 
in the later year because of the sharp increase in migration and the increase in the proportion of 
poor households in the migration process. The relative impacts on FGT measures under scenario 
(b): the highest impact observed on severity and the lowest on the incidence of poverty, with 
larger effects when using the remittance-amount model.  
As we can see, remittance has a larger impact on the depth and severity of poverty (P1, 
P2) than on the incidence of poverty (P0). This might be related to the uneven distribution of 
poor households among migration destinations. Firstly, ultra-poor households migrate to cope 
with food and employment scarcity to places that are less costly. For instance, small transfers 
from India contribute to household earnings and food security. Even if these transfers do not 
bring the poorest households above the poverty line (and so do not affect P0) at least these can 
help to bring the household nearer to it (improving P1 and P2). Indeed, as shown in Table 1 
(Panel D), there is a higher level of poverty among Indian migrant households compared with the 
national average. Secondly, less poor households can afford to send a member to relatively more 
costly and risky places. In this case, remittance helps to eradicate poverty (i.e. improve P0) rather 
than just bringing the poor households near the poverty line. 
The above findings are robust when we use an international poverty line i.e. US$1/day in 
both scenario (a) and (b), and for all FGT measures (Table 5 and 6, Panel C) or when we double 
it (Table 5 and 6, Panel D). The estimated impacts on poverty for US$1/day poverty line are 
slightly larger than those for the national poverty line while that for US$ 2/day are about 50% 
smaller than those for the national poverty line.  
Next, we calculate the impacts of remittance from different sources by constructing the 
counterfactual scenario under which no household receives remittances from a particular source 
country (Table 7). We first distinguish only between domestic versus foreign (India or third 
countries). The simulations using both the remittance-dummy and remittance-income models 
show that the effect of foreign remittance on FGT measures is mostly larger than that of 
domestic remittance in both years. The results are mostly similar with the international poverty 
lines. When we use US$2/day poverty line, domestic remittance has larger effects on incidence, 
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depth and severity of poverty than international remittance while the later one has larger effect 
when we use the US$1/day poverty line. This is possibly due to the larger participation of the 
lower quintiles in Indian migration. 
[Tables 7 about here]  
So, we further disaggregate foreign remittance into India and other countries. Although 
average per capita remittance earning of Indian migrants is far lower than that of third country 
migrants, Table 7 shows that Indian remittance contributes at least 80% (90% in 1996) of the 
impact of overall foreign remittance on poverty reduction. The impact of Indian remittances 
increases sharply when we use US$1/day poverty line but it decreases for US$2/day poverty line 
in both years while remittance from third countries has nearly the same impact for all three 
poverty lines. The reason for the larger impact of Indian remittance18 on poverty reduction is that 
the ultra-poor mostly migrate to India, whereas most of the third country migrants come from 
less poor (or richer) households. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics (Table 1, Panel 
D and Table 2, Panel D). 
Finally, Figure 1 shows the impact of remittance on poverty across six regions for 
scenario (a) using the national poverty line. It shows that the regions that have higher levels of 
migration (e.g. Rural Western Hills/Mountains (RWH) and Rural Eastern Terai (RET)) would 
experience a larger poverty reduction than the regions which have lower migration. This result is 
stronger in 2004 (Part B and D) than in 1996 (Part A and C). Our results are similar to Taylor, et 
al. (2005), who also found a correlation between the magnitude of poverty reduction and the 
level of migration. 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
C.2. Impacts of Migration and Remittance on Inequality 
Table 5 and 6 (Panel E) show the effects of remittance on income inequality at the 
national level. Using the remittance-dummy model under scenario (a), the inequality decreases 
marginally in 1996 and decreases by even a smaller amount in 2004 (Table 5, Panel E) with 
respect to the baseline simulation. Furthermore, if we use the remittance-income model (Table 6, 
Panel E) the inequality decreases unequivocally in both years, but again decreases less in 2004. 
Similar results hold also for scenario (b). Hence, results indicate that remittance increases 
                                                              
18 The domestic and Indian remittances have almost equal share (23%) of total remittance receipts among all households of Nepal and 
remaining 53% remittance is received from rest of the other countries (CBS, 2004). 
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inequality, but less so in the second round of the survey. Although this finding does not agree 
with the study from Nepal (Lokshin, et al. 2007), it is consistent with the migration process in 
Nepal becoming more mature, which may have reduced the costs and risks involved in migration, 
as well as facilitated the participation of the bottom quintile. This is consistent with the results of 
Stark et al. (1986) in the case of Mexico.  
However, remittances from different sources have diverse impact on inequality. In the 
absence of domestic remittance (scenario (a)), the inequality would decrease in 1996 but not in 
2004. In the absence of foreign (i.e. Indian and others) remittance inequality would increase in 
both years. But when we split foreign remittance into Indian and other countries, the Indian 
remittance is found to be income equalizer in both years, while the opposite is true for other 
country remittances. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we consistently and efficiently estimate the determinants of consumption 
using a fixed effect model and including sufficient household and community level controls to 
address the endogeneity of remittances. Econometric results show that the consumption is higher 
for remittance receiving households and it increases with remittance income, other things being 
the same.  
The simulation results show that if none of the households received remittances, the 
incidence of poverty (P0), measured by the national poverty line, would have increased by at 
least 2.3% and at most 3.3% in 1996 and at least 4.6% and at most 7.6% in 2004 (the lower 
bounds correspond to the remittance-dummy model while the upper bounds to the remittance-
amount model). Impacts on the depth (P1) and severity of poverty (P2) are even larger. The 
regional simulations show a strong correlation between the incidence of remittance and the 
magnitude of poverty reduction, implying variation of impacts among regions. The destination is 
another important factor determining the impact of remittance on poverty. Although the 
remittance from third country migration is more than seven times higher than that from India, 
Indian migration is a necessity for the poorest households that experience severe credit 
limitations (WFP, 2008). So, it has a far larger impact on poverty reduction in comparison with 
domestic and other countries’ remittance. In this way, although remittance from India acts as an 
income equalizer, remittance from other countries has the adverse effect. The overall effect of 
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remittances on income equality is negative but this adverse effect has decreased over time. These 
stylized facts are consistent with Stark, et al. (1986) and Taylor et al. (2005). 
Nepal would witness a sharp fall in poverty and income inequality if the government 
implemented policies that enabled poor households to send their migrants to developed countries 
instead of India. Policies that could facilitate this switch of destinations might include providing 
more credit opportunities and also education to acquire the skills required for third country 
migration. Although policy makers face the challenge of designing effective skill development 
programs for less educated people, these programs might have a high return because skilled 
(even low-skilled) migrant workers might have a better opportunity of obtaining a safe and high-
earning job in third countries. The other measures for the bottom quintile might include 
programs to disseminate information related to migration/remittance and strengthening the legal 
status of contracts among potential migrants, manpower companies and foreign employers. 
These would also be appropriate anti-poverty strategies on their own right. 
Future research might look at the role of migration and remittance on reducing the 
vulnerability to rural production shocks in a general equilibrium environment. Moreover, we 
would like to understand how migration and remittances affect physical/human capital 
investments, local labor productivity and the intergenerational transmission of poverty and 
inequality. 
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TABLE 1 
POVERTY, CONSUMPTION AND ASSET HOLDING BY SECTOR, REGIONS AND REMITTANCE SOURCES 
 Headcount Poverty (%) Per Capita Consumption (NPR) Durables (NPR) Agricultural Land (Ha) 
1996 2004 1996 2004 1996 2004  1996 2004 
All Nepal                 
Nepal 41 32 7,297 9,590 427 741 0.82 0.77 
Nepal* 42 31 7,235 10,318 - - - - 
By sector: 
Rural 41 32 6,813 9,011 274 517 0.84 0.80 
Urban 32 30 16,155 17,474 3,152 4,094 0.36 0.42 
Rural* 43 35 6,694 8,499 - - - - 
Urban* 22 10 14,536 20,633 - - - - 
By region: 
KTM 12 3 23,185 30,216 4,151 7,035 0.09 0.05 
OTHR 45 41 11,500 11,823 2,373 2,353 0.57 0.64 
RWH 54 27 5,995 8,484 107 352 0.55 0.77 
REH 28 37 7,457 8,430 355 278 0.62 0.73 
RWT 58 36 6,908 8,441 257 646 1.43 1.05 
RET 35 30 6,888 10,046 356 784 1.00 0.76 
By remittance-sources: 
ALL 37 28 7,440 9,389 436 510 0.71 0.74 
DOM 35 27 7,631 9,494 553 538 0.86 0.70 
FOR 42 29 7,247 9,161 375 530 0.54 0.77 
IND 43 36 6,350 7,431 193 282 0.56 0.73 
OTHR 29 10 21,166 13,567 3,110 1,246 0.35 0.94 
Source. Authors’ calculation using NLSS I and II data. 
Note. Sample size is 962 for both 1996 and 2004. Per capita consumption and durables are in terms of 1996 NPR. * Measures are for cross-section sample. KTM, OTHR, 
RWH, REH, RWT, and RET are Kathmandu Valley, Other urban areas, Rural Western Hills, Rural Eastern Hills, Rural Western Terai, and Rural Eastern Terai respectively. 
All, DOM, FOR, IND, and OTHR are remittance received from all sources, within Nepal, India and other countries (except India) respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
PROPORTION OF REMITTANCE RECEIVING HOUSEHOLDS BY SECTORS AND REGIONS, AND DISTRIBUTION OF REMITTANCE AMONG 
QUINTILES  
  1996  2004 
  All DOM FOR IND OTHR All DOM FOR IND OTHR 
 All Nepal 23.3 12.4 12.1 11.4 0.7 36.9 20.2 18.3 13.9 4.7 
By sector: 
Rural 23.8 12.5 12.5 11.8 0.7 37.5 21 18.2 14.3 4.3 
Urban 15.2 10.1 5.6 4.1 1.5 28.3 8.8 19.5 8.8 10.8 
By regions: 
KTM 12.1 11.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 10.1 3.1 7.0 0.0 7.0 
OTHR 17.7 9.3 9.3 7.3 1.9 39.1 12.2 26.9 13.9 13.0 
RWH 34.4 13.3 22.5 20.7 1.8 47.4 20.8 28.8 25.2 4.6 
REH 12.8 10.9 2.5 2.3 0.2 29.6 20.9 8.7 3.6 5.0 
RWT 17.7 12.4 6.2 6.2 0.0 28.0 17.5 12.6 7.6 5.0 
RET 26.1 13.3 14.6 14.1 0.4 39.3 22.6 19.3 16.1 3.2 
Distribution of remittance-source 
among quintile: 
Poorest 20% 17.9  13.0  22.5  24.4  0.0  14.9  15.5  13.6  17.0  2.7 
Next 20% 15.4  19.0  14.7  14.5  18.0  14.3  12.4  16.6  17.7  12.6 
Next 20% 20.3  11.4  27.9  29.7  0.0  18.0  18.9  19.6  23.2  10.6 
Next 20% 21.6  28.1  13.0  12.8  15.1  26.1  24.0  28.7  28.8  29.6 
Wealthiest 20% 24.8  28.5  21.6  18.6  66.9  25.7  29.2  21.5  13.3  44.5 
Total 100  100  100  100  100    100  100  100  100  100 
Source. Authors’ calculation using NLSS I and II panel data. 
Note. Sample size is 962 for both 1996 and 2004. KTM, OTHR, RWH, REH, RWT, and RET are Kathmandu Valley, Other urban areas, Rural Western Hills, Rural Eastern 
Hills, Rural Western Terai, and Rural Eastern Terai respectively. All, DOM, FOR, IND, and OTHR are remittance received from all sources, within Nepal, India and other 
countries (except India) respectively. 
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-26
20 
 
TABLE 3 
REGRESSIONS FOR THE EFFECTS OF REMITTANCE ON NATURAL LOGARITHM OF PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
  A: Remittance-Dummy Model B: Remittance-Income Model 
POLS RE FE FE-IV-GMM POLS RE FE FE-IV-GMM 
  (E1) (E2) (E3) (E4) (E5) (E6) (E7) (E8) 
Remittance  0.098*** 0.097*** 0.064* 0.179* 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.027* 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.036) (0.10) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) 
{0.047 - 
0.150} 
{0.046 - 
0.147} 
{0.007 - 
0.136} {0.016 - 0.374} 
{0.012 - 
0.027} 
{0.012 - 
0.027} 
{0.005 - 
0.025} {0.002 - 0.055} 
Observations / Groups 1,924 1,924 / 962 1,924 / 962 1,924 / 962 1,924 1,924 / 962 1,924 / 962 1,924/962 
R- Squared 0.577 0.42 0.413 0.581 0.424 0.421 
Hausman Test 97.05 [0] 98.25[0]
Hansen J statistics 0.25 [0.62] 0.211 [0.65] 
KPLM statistics 67.89  [0] 65.70 [0] 
Cragg-Donald statistics    
67.88    55.25 
41.96 39.21 
Sargan test for endogeneity 
(Chi-2) 
       1.49  [0.22]       0.68 [ 0.41] 
Source. Own calculation using NLSS I and II panel data.  
Note. POLS= pooled ordinary least square; RE=random effects; FE=fixed effects; FE-IV-GMM=fixed effects instrumental variable generalized methods of moments. 
Figures in (), {} and [] are Robust standard errors, confidence intervals and p-values respectively. The migrated population above 15 years (%) and proportion of remittance 
receiving households in ward are used as instruments for specification (E4) and (E8). In Remittance-dummy model (specifications E1- E4), remittance means whether a 
household receives remittance while in Remittance-income model it means natural logarithm of one plus per capita remittance income (specifications E5-E8). Control 
variables include household characteristics, household head characteristics, durable asset and agricultural land holding, regional dummies, ethnicity dummies, ward level 
characteristics and time dummy (for details see table 4). 
* Significant at 10% level. 
 ** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
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TABLE 4 
FIXED EFFECT ESTIMATION OF NATURAL LOGARITHM OF PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
Remittance Dummy Model Remittance Income Model 
  
Coefficient Robust Standard Errors Coefficient 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
Remittance 0.064* 0.036 0.015*** 0.005 
Household Characteristics: 
Household composition: 
Log of Household size -0.251*** 0.063 -0.256*** 0.063 
Share of children 0-3: Reference cat. 
Share of children 4-7 0.199 0.208 0.225 0.207 
Share of children 8-15 0.360** 0.152 0.385** 0.152 
Share of men 16-64 1.082*** 0.182 1.087*** 0.181 
Share of women 16-64 0.846*** 0.204 0.850*** 0.202 
Share or elderly 64+ 0.616*** 0.204 0.630*** 0.203 
Married members # -0.029 0.023 -0.027 0.023 
Household Head Characteristics: 
Education (Ref: illiterate): 
Informal Education -0.146 0.148 -0.163 0.143 
Primary education 0.067 0.053 0.064 0.052 
Secondary education 0.038 0.067 0.036 0.067 
Higher education 0.018 0.126 0.034 0.124 
Male 0.068 0.063 0.086 0.063 
Age 0.012 0.007 0.012* 0.007 
Age squared -0.009 0.007 -0.01 0.007 
Ever migrated -0.006 0.07 -0.001 0.069 
Employment dummies (Ref: inactive): 
Wage in agriculture -0.139** 0.059 -0.131** 0.059 
Wage in non agriculture -0.048 0.062 -0.04 0.062 
Self employment in agriculture -0.037 0.044 -0.035 0.043 
Self employment in non agriculture -0.016 0.069 -0.006 0.068 
Unemployed 0.069 0.065 0.074 0.065 
Durables  (Ref:  Asset poor) 
Asset rich 0.173*** 0.064 0.169*** 0.063 
Agriculture land holding  
(Ref: No agricultural land):     
<.5 ha -0.068 0.061 -0.068 0.061 
0.5-1 Ha 0.011 0.069 0.013 0.068 
1-2 Ha 0.092 0.071 0.092 0.071 
>2 Ha 0.066 0.092 0.065 0.091 
Log per capita pension 0.019 0.013 0.021 0.013 
Regional Dummies: 
(KTM, RWH, REH, RWT, RET dropped)    
Other urban  region 0.013 0.147 0.013 0.142 
Ethnicity dummies (Dropped): 
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Remittance Dummy Model Remittance Income Model 
  
Coefficient Robust Standard Errors Coefficient 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
Ward level characteristics: 
Log mean ward consumption 0.642*** 0.053 0.640*** 0.053 
Illiterate population >15 years 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
SLC passed population >15 years -0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.003 
Wage in agriculture % 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Wage in non agriculture % 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 
Self employment in agriculture % -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Self employment in non agriculture % -0.007 0.004 -0.006 0.004 
Unemployed % 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Time dummy 0.073 0.045 0.067 0.044 
Constant 1.427** 0.689 1.408** 0.686 
Observations [Groups] 1,924 [962] 1,924 [962] 
R-squared 0.42   0.424   
Source. Authors’ calculation using NLSS I and II panel data. 
Note. In remittance-dummy model (specifications E1- E4), remittance means whether a household receives remittance 
while, in remittance-income model (specifications E5-E8), it means natural logarithm of one plus per capita remittance 
income. 
 * Significant at 10% level. 
 ** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level
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TABLE 5 
IMPACTS OF REMITTANCE ON CONSUMPTION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY  
(SIMULATION BASED ON REMITTANCE-DUMMY MODEL) 
Measures 1996 2004 
Actual Baseline SCEN A SCEN B Actual Baseline SCEN A SCEN B 
C/F % ∆ % ∆ C/F % ∆ % ∆ 
Consumption:            
Consumption Per Capita 7,297 7,400 7,295 -1.41 0.06  9,590 9,452 9,258 -2.06 0.09 
Poverty (National poverty line):     
 
     
 
Head Count (P0) 41.04 42.54 43.52 2.29 -0.04  31.83 29.94 31.32 4.61 -0.17 
Poverty Gap (P1) 11.32 12.07 12.49 3.42 -0.08  7.07 7.36 7.83 6.36 -0.23 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 4.44 4.69 4.89 4.26 -0.13  2.35 2.61 2.80 7.49 -0.24 
Poverty ($1/day poverty line):     
 
     
 
Head Count (P0) 33.41 35.01 35.96 2.71 -0.02  20.47 21.65 22.88 5.68 -0.20 
Poverty Gap (P1) 8.49 9.11 9.46 3.86 -0.09  4.35 4.80 5.15 7.30 -0.26 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 3.17 3.31 3.47 4.74 -0.16  1.37 1.58 1.71 8.30 -0.24 
Poverty ($2/day poverty line):     
 
     
 
Head Count (P0) 76.11 74.77 75.54 1.02 -0.07  63.53 63.13 64.55 2.26 -0.10 
Poverty Gap (P1) 31.32 31.70 32.31 1.92 -0.05  23.6 23.11 23.97 3.70 -0.14 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 15.93 16.42 16.84 2.56 -0.06  10.91 10.81 11.32 4.75 -0.17 
Inequality:          
Gini Coefficient 0.349 0.333 0.333 -0.03 0.00  0.399 0.354 0.355 0.17 0.00 
Source. Authors’ calculation using NLSS I and II panel data. 
Note.  SCEN A: Scenario of no households receives remittance. SCEN B:  Scenario of 1% increase in the proportion of remittance receiving households. The column labeled 
C/F contains the simulated value under the counterfactual scenario. % ∆ indicates the percentage change with respect to the baseline. Consumption per capita is in NPR 
(constant price 1996). 
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TABLE 6 
IMPACTS OF REMITTANCE ON CONSUMPTION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
(SIMULATION BASED ON REMITTANCE-INCOME MODEL)  
Measures 1996  2004 
Actual Baseline SCEN A SCEN B Actual Baseline SCEN A SCEN B 
      C/F % ∆ % ∆     C/F % ∆ % ∆ 
Consumption:            
Consumption Per Capita 7,297  7,396  7,227  ‐2.28  0.11  9,590  9,451  9,108  ‐3.62  0.17 
Poverty (National poverty line):              
Head Count (P0) 41.04  42.57  43.97  3.30  ‐0.25   31.83  30.00  32.28  7.60  ‐0.45 
Poverty Gap (P1) 11.32  12.06  12.66  5.02  ‐0.34   7.07  7.37  8.14  10.54  ‐0.45 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 4.44  4.68  4.98  6.40  ‐0.42   2.35  2.61  2.93  12.51  ‐0.45 
Poverty ($1/day poverty line):              
Head Count (P0) 33.41  35.01  36.37  3.87  ‐0.25   20.47  21.68  23.71  9.34  ‐0.48 
Poverty Gap (P1) 8.49  9.09  9.61  5.71  ‐0.38   4.35  4.81  5.39  12.15  ‐0.44 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 3.17  3.30  3.54  7.21  ‐0.47   1.37  1.58  1.80  13.97  ‐0.45 
Poverty ($2/day poverty line):              
Head Count (P0) 76.11  74.81  76.04  1.65  ‐0.08   63.53  63.13  65.52  3.78  ‐0.13 
Poverty Gap (P1) 31.32  31.71  32.62  2.88  ‐0.17   23.6  23.13  24.56  6.16  ‐0.28 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 15.93  16.42  17.04  3.79  ‐0.24   10.91  10.82  11.67  7.90  ‐0.36 
Inequality:              
Gini Coefficient 0.349  0.333  0.332  ‐0.39  ‐0.03   0.399  0.354  0.354  ‐0.14  0.03 
Source. Authors’ calculation using NLSS I and II panel data.  
Note.  SCEN A: Scenario of no households receives remittance. SCEN B:  Scenario of proportion of remittance receiving households increases by 1% and these households 
start to receive remittance equal to the average baseline remittance. Other labels are as in Table 5. 
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TABLE 7 
IMPACTS OF REMITTANCE ON CONSUMPTION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY  
BY SOURCE OF REMITTANCE 
Measures Baseline No DOM REM No FOR REM No IND REM No OTHR REM 
    C/F % ∆ C/F % ∆ C/F % ∆ C/F % ∆ 
Remittance – Dummy Model 
(in 1996):                   
Consumption Per Capita 7,400 7,341 -0.80 7,354 -0.62 7,360 -0.54 7,394 -0.07 
Head Count (P0) 42.54 43.05 1.19 43.05 1.19 43.06 1.20 42.57 0.06 
Poverty Gap (P1) 12.07 12.27 1.63 12.31 1.93 12.3 1.91 12.08 0.06 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 4.69 4.78 1.93 4.81 2.48 4.81 2.45 4.69 0.04 
Gini Coefficient 0.333 0.333 -0.15 0.334 0.18 0.334 0.30 0.333 -0.09 
Remittance - Income Model  
(in 1996): 
Consumption Per Capita 7,396 7,298 -1.34 7,323 -0.99 7,335 -0.83 7,384 -0.16 
Head Count (P0) 42.57 43.32 1.77 43.30 1.71 43.27 1.64 42.59 0.05 
Poverty Gap (P1) 12.06 12.34 2.34 12.41 2.89 12.4 2.81 12.07 0.06 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 4.68 4.81 2.79 4.86 3.86 4.86 3.79 4.68 0.06 
Gini Coefficient 0.333 0.332 -0.42 0.334 0.15 0.334 0.39 0.332 -0.21 
Remittance - Dummy Model  
(in 2004): 
Consumption Per Capita 9,452 9,352 -1.06 9,348 -1.10 9,389 -0.67 9,408 -0.47 
Head Count (P0) 29.94 30.6 2.21 30.73 2.64 30.6 2.21 30.08 0.49 
Poverty Gap (P1) 7.36 7.58 3.02 7.64 3.77 7.60 3.34 7.39 0.43 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 2.61 2.70 3.61 2.72 4.40 2.71 3.97 2.62 0.40 
Gini Coefficient 0.354 0.354 0.00 0.355 0.23 0.356 0.54 0.353 -0.28 
Remittance - Income Model  
(in 2004): 
Consumption Per Capita 9,451 9,286 -1.75 9,260 -2.02 9,346 -1.11 9,359 -0.97 
Head Count (P0) 30.00 31.04 3.49 31.34 4.46 31.06 3.56 30.32 1.06 
Poverty Gap (P1) 7.37 7.72 4.82 7.83 6.28 7.77 5.43 7.44 1.00 
Poverty Gap Squared (P2) 2.61 2.76 5.72 2.80 7.43 2.78 6.65 2.63 0.96 
 Gini Coefficient 0.354 0.354 -0.14 0.355 0.11 0.357 0.82 0.352 -0.62 
Source. Authors’ calculation using NLSS I and II panel data. 
Note. DOM, FOR, IND, and OTHR are remittance from within Nepal, foreign countries, India and other countries 
(except India), respectively. C/F is the scenario under which no household receives remittance from a particular 
destination: DOM, FOR, IND or OTHR. National poverty line is used. Other labels are as in Table 5. 
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FIGURE 1 
SIMULATION FOR CHANGE IN HEAD COUNT POVERTY (P0) ACROSS REGIONS IN 
COUNTERFACTUAL SCENARIO OF NO HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVED REMITTANCE 
Source. Authors’ calculation using NLSS I and II panel data. 
Note. The regions: KTM, OTHR, RWH, REH, RWT, and RET are Kathmandu Valley, Other Urban areas, 
Rural Western Hills, Rural Eastern Hills, Rural Western Terai, and Rural Eastern Terai respectively. Data labels 
are for change in head count poverty (P0). 
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